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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kody Evan Jones appeals from his judgment for malicious harassment.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Jones for malicious harassment.

(R., pp. 36-37.)

The

allegations in the indictment were that Jones "maliciously and with the intent to intimidate
or harass Evander Cobbs because of his race, cause [sic] physical injury to Evander Cobbs
by hitting him" or aiding and abetting "the same." (Id.)
Prior to trial the prosecution filed a notice of intent to use a redacted video of the
defendant in the police car immediately after his arrest. (R., pp. 98-99.) The video depicts
a profanity and racial-epithet laced (and occasionally musical) tirade about being arrested.
(State's Exhibit 5.) The defense objected to the admission of the video on the basis that it
was irrelevant and any probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice. (Tr., p. 73, Ls. 7-21; p. 98, Ls. 17-19; p. 214, L. 22-p. 215, L. 2.) The
prosecutor argued it was relevant because Jones "makes a number of racially charged
statements" and slurs, and made other claims that the victim should have been harmed (he
should have been "buried" or "hung from a tree"). (Tr., p. 73, L. 23 - p. 74, L. 19.) The
district court found the evidence relevant and rejected the argument it should be excluded
for unfair prejudice. (Tr., p. 74, L. 20 - p. 75, L. 21; p. 98, Ls. 20-21; p. 209, L. 16 - p.
210, L. 12; p. 215, Ls. 3-19.)
The evidence at trial showed that Evander Cobbs was with friends at the Harrison
Regatta when Jones and another man confronted Cobbs and made racial statements. (Tr.,
p. 130, L. 23 - p. 133, L. 14; p. 173, L. 9 - p. 175, L. 6; p. 175, L. 10 - p. 176, L. 17; p.
1

177, L. 7 – p. 178, L. 24.) Cobbs is of African-American descent. (Tr., p. 175, Ls. 7-9.)
Words were exchanged and the man with Jones hit Cobbs in the face. (Tr., p. 133, L. 15 –
p. 134, L. 4; p. 178, L. 25 – p. 184, L. 22.) This led to a general melee involving Jones and
his friend and Cobbs and one of his friends that was broken up by bystanders. (Tr., p. 134,
L. 5 – p. 135, L. 5; p. 184, L. 23 – p. 191, L. 2.) Cobbs suffered a cut below his eye,
bruising on his neck and elbow, and other general injuries. (Tr., p. 100, L. 13 – p. 101, L.
19; p. 191, L. 9 – p. 192, L. 8; State’s Exhibits 1-3.)
Kootenai County sheriff’s deputies responded to a report of the fight. (Tr., p. 83,
L. 20 – p. 88, L. 2.) At the docks the deputies encountered Jones. (Tr., p. 88, L. 3 – p. 89,
L. 13.) Jones was agitated, smelled of alcohol, and had blood on his shirt. (Tr., p. 89, L.
14 – p. 90, L. 17.) In addition, the middle finger and knuckle of Jones’ right hand were
swollen. (Tr., p. 90, L. 18 – p. 91, L. 5.) The swelling was consistent with Jones have
recently hit something or someone. (Tr., p. 91, Ls. 6-14.) When deputies arrested Jones
he stated it was wrong that he was arrested “because of a nigger.” (Tr., p. 96, Ls. 8-22.)
This is a statement he repeated, in one form or another, several times while in the police
car. (State’s Exhibit 5, 02:25-02:45 (“Why isn’t the fucking nigger arrested? Why is the
God-damn white man arrested?”); 03:01 (That little nigger had it coming! … We should
have fucking buried him!”); 04:42-05:01 ([sung] “Now I’m probably going to jail, ‘cause
they won’t listen to my side, they want to listen to the colored guy.”); 15:22-15:36
(complaining that he could not go home “because some fucking nigger said something.
Bullshit!”); 16:22-17:05 (“Fucking arrested because I’m fucking white. Why isn’t the
nigger arrested? Oh! Because I’m white. Oh my God, it’s a fucking hate crime against a
God-damn nigger.”); 17:42-17:48 (“Fucking nigger pride. Fuck your nigger pride.”);
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18:31-19:05 (“now [inaudible] fucking hate crime because some fucking nigger opened his
God-damned mouth”); 21:44-22:00 (in mocking tone: “you have to go to jail because he’s
a nigger, and the white guy has to go to jail, we don’t believe the white guy”); 32:07-32:16
(complained he was going to jail because “some little nigger said I fucking started
something”); 33:45-34:22 (“nigger had to open his mouth and say the guy in orange started
this”); 35:10-35:57 (complaining of being arrested “because some little black man said I
just started something. Fuck him and the horse he rode in on. I want to tie him to a rope
and hang him from a fucking tree. That sounds pretty good to me right now, watch him
squirm, gasping for air.”); 40:35-41:03 (“You should arrest the nigger instead of me. Oh,
wait! He’s a nigger! It’s a hate crime to arrest a nigger! But it’s all right to arrest a white
man. Fucking little Jew [referring to the victim]. … He’s a nigger-Jew.”); 41:15-41:41
(“you ain’t going to fucking listen to me, ‘cause I’m a white guy”); 44:00-44:20 (“I get
arrested because some evil black guy said I did something I wasn’t supposed to.”).)
The jury convicted Jones of malicious harassment. (R., p. 157.) The district court
imposed a sentence of five years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp. 170-74.) After the retained jurisdiction the district court placed Jones on probation.
(R., pp. 195-202.) Jones filed a notice of appeal timely from the initial judgment of the
district court. (R., pp. 176-79, 189-93.)
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ISSUES
Jones states the issues 0n appeal

I.

Whether the

as:

district court erred

by admitting

the Video of Mr. Jones

since, under the applicable legal standards, it was unduly prejudicial
and the only probative value it might have had was merely

cumulative.

II.

Whether the

district court erred

by admitting Mr. Cobb’s

[sic]

inadmissible hearsay testimony about what Mr. Schwartz, a third
party, said during the incident.

III.

Whether the accumulation 0f errors in this case requires reversal
even if this Court determines them all t0 be individually harmless.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Jones

failed t0

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

by admitting

evidence 0f Jones’ statements and demeanor immediately following his arrest for
this

2.

crime?

Has Jones

failed t0

show

that the evidence

of Jones’ friend’s statements was

hearsay?

3.

Has Jones
cumulate?

failed t0

show cumulative

error because he has failed t0

show

error t0

ARGUMENT
I.

Jones Has Failed To

Of Jones’

Evidence

Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Admitting
And Demeanor Immediately Following His Arrest For

Statements

This Crime

A.

Introduction

The

district court

admitted State’s Exhibit

5,

was

a recording of Jones while he

the back seat 0f the police car immediately after his arrest, over objections that

irrelevant or that

its

probative value

was signiﬁcantly outweighed by

it

in

was

potential prejudice.

(TL, p. 73, L. 7 —p. 75, L. 21; p. 98, Ls. 15-21; p. 209, L. 16 —p. 210, L. 12; p. 214, L. 22

— p.

215, L. 19.) Jones argues that the evidence

denials of having been involved and

Jones’ racial animus.

was

was

irrelevant because

it

unfairly prejudicial because

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)

backwards: the evidence was relevant because

it

included Jones”

it

demonstrates

This argument gets

it

exactly

demonstrates his racial animus, which

is

an element 0f the crime.

Standard

B.

“The
and

its

Of Review

trial

court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion 0f evidence

decision t0 admit evidence Will be reversed only

of that discretion.”

State V. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625,

“Whether evidence

is

gm, 164 Idaho

118,

review the
outweighs

P.3d

at

relevant

is

an issue 0f law, which

426 P.3d 469, 473 (2018)

district court’s

its

When there

has been a clear abuse

m

402 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2017).

we

review de nova.”

(internal quotations omitted).

“We

determination 0f Whether the probative value 0f the evidence

prejudicial effect for an abuse 0f discretion.”

1079 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

Mg 162 Idaho

at

626, 402

“Similarly, a district court’s

determination that evidence

is

admissible under I.R.E. 404(b)

discretion.” State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160,

reviewed for an abuse 0f

426 P.3d 1260, 1265 (2018).

The Evidence Was Admissible To Show Speciﬁc
Cobbs Because Of His Race

C.

is

Intent

T0

“Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency t0

any

make

Or Harass

the existence 0f

0f consequence t0 the determination 0f the action more probable 0r

fact that is

probable than

Intimidate

would be without

it

the evidence.”

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 774,

less

419

P.3d 1042, 1072 (2018) (internal quotes and brackets omitted) (citing I.R.E. 401 (2004)).

“The court may exclude relevant evidence

by a danger of

.

..

if its

probative value

is

substantially outweighed

unfair prejudice.” I.R.E. 403. “Rule 403 does not require the exclusion

0f prejudicial evidence. Most evidence offered to prove a defendant’s
prejudicial.

The

rule only applies to evidence that is unfairly prejudicial because

to suggest that the jury should base its decision

627, 402 P.3d at 1080.

ﬂ

also State V.

on an improper basis.”

it

it

tends

m, 162 Idaho

at

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179

(1998) (I.R.E. 403 requires exclusion only 0f evidence “Which
that

guilt is inherently

is

unfairly prejudicial such

tends to suggest a decision 0n an improper basis”).

Rule 404(b), in

turn, provides that

evidence “of a crime, wrong, or other act

admissible t0 prove a person’s character in order to

show

that

person acted in accordance with the character.” I.R.E. 404(b)

“may be

not

on a particular occasion the

(1).

Such evidence, however,

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 0f mistake, 0r lack of accident.”

404(b)(2).

is

If the

proposed evidence

is

I.R.E.

relevant to both actions in conformance with

character and a proper non-character purpose, the court must “engage in the I.R.E. 403

balancing

test:

whether the probative value of the evidence

the danger 0f unfair prejudice t0 the defendant.”

P.3d 1179, 1184

(Ct.

App. 2014)

Cook

is

substantially outweighed

V. State,

(citing State V. Sheldon,

by

157 Idaho 775, 780, 339

145 Idaho 225, 229, 178 P.3d

28, 32 (2008)).

“‘Speciﬁc intent may, and ordinarily must, be proved by circumstantial evidence....

One’s intent

may be proved by his

mode of proving

m,

intent.”’

Mg

acts

and conduct, and such

162 Idaho

at

V. Ehrlick,

is

thus relevant and

m

the usual and customary

628, 402 P.3d at 1081 (quoting

92 Idaho 124, 132, 438 P.2d 275, 283 (1968)).

acted With a speciﬁc intent

is

Evidence that a defendant has

may be admitted under I.R.E.

404(b).

m

158 Idaho 900, 914-916, 354 P.3d 462, 476-78 (2015) (“evidence of Ehrlick’s

intent to inﬂict suffering 0r t0 satisfy sadistic intentions is highly relevant”).

To prove malicious harassment,

the state

had

t0

prove that Jones “[c]aus[ed]

physical injury,” or aided and abetted another to “[c]ause physical injury” to Cobbs,

“maliciously and With the speciﬁc intent to intimidate or harass [him] because of [his] race
[0r] ancestry.”

Americans

LC.

§

in his tirade,

was based 0n Cobbs’

18-7902.

Jones amply demonstrated his malice toward African

and evidence of his comments tended

race.

to

show

his speciﬁc intent

The evidence was thus relevant to the malice and speciﬁc

intent

elements ofthe crime. Moreover, because malice and speciﬁc intent t0 intimidate or harass
are elements of the crime, the evidence

was not

unfairly prejudicial.

T0

the contrary, that

Jones acted 0n racist beliefs he in fact held was a direct element of the case against him.

Evidence 0f Jones’

racist beliefs

was

therefore relevant and admissible t0

speciﬁc intent to intimidate or harass Cobbs because 0f his race.

show malice and

This case
2013).

is

similar t0 State V. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221,

307 P.3d 1247

Like Jones, Tankovich was charged With malicious harassment.

also charged With conspiracy t0 maliciously harass.

At

issue in that case

(Ct.

App.

Tankovich was

was admission of

evidence that Tankovich’s co-conspirators had tattoos endorsing white supremacy.

The

Court of Appeals ﬁrst concluded “that the tattoos were relevant t0 the motive 0r intent of
the persons bearing them.” Li. at 225, 307 P.3d at 1251.

was

In turn, evidence 0f the tattoos

relevant to prove the speciﬁc intent of malicious harassment and conspiracy.

Li. at

225-26, 307 P.3d at 125 1 -52. The court also concluded that the argument that the evidence

of the Nazi tattoos was prejudicial was n0 more than rehashing the argument that they were
not relevant.

Li at 226, 307 P.3d at

Views was evidence 0f his
t0

intent,

prove the very point to Which

1252. Like in Tankovich, the evidence ofJones’ racist

and
it

it

was

was not unfairly prejudicial

t0 present the evidence

relevant.

Jones ﬁrst argues that the evidence of his racist Views was irrelevant because he

denied being involved in battering Cobbs. (Appellant’s

brief, pp. 7-8.)

As noted

above,

there are three elements to the crime 0f malicious harassment as charged: (1) causing (0r

aiding and abetting the causing 0f) physical injury; (2) with malice; and (3) with speciﬁc
intent t0 intimidate 0r harass because

0f race or national

origin.

I.C. §

18-7902.

The

evidence was relevant t0 the second and third elements (malice and speciﬁc intent to
intimidate or harass because of race or national origin). That the evidence

t0 the ﬁrst

facts

element does not make

it

irrelevant.

was not relevant

The evidence had a tendency t0 prove two

“of consequence in determining the action,” I.R.E. 401, namely malice and speciﬁc

racist intent.

Jones next argues that the evidence was relevant only for “an improper propensity
analysis” because

it

“indicates that he holds particular Views toward people of African

American heritage, and that any actions he took that evening must have conformed t0 those
Views.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)

E

evidence was relevant.
Speciﬁcally, the evidence

This, however,

Tankovich, 155 Idaho

was admitted

to

show

a precise statement of

at

225-26, 307 P.3d at 1251-52.

“any actions he took

that

why

is

namely inﬂicting an injury on Cobb or aiding and abetting another

the

that evening,”

d0

t0

so,

were

undertaken because “he holds particular Views toward people of African American

As

heritage.”

to

in Tankovich, evidence

show the speciﬁc

racial intent

of Jones’ White supremacist Views was admissible

of his crime.1 The evidence was relevant and not unfairly

prejudicial.

II.

Jones Has Failed

T0 Show That The Evidence Of Jones’

Friend’s Statements

Was

Hearsay
A.

Introduction

Over Jones’ hearsay
him, boy.

He

then that’s

when

said are

you

[Jones]

0r White p0wer.’”

objection,

for black

chimed

(T12, p.

in

Cobbs testiﬁed

that Jones’ friend said:

“‘You heard

power—or for nigger power or for White power?’ And

and

said, ‘Yeah. I

182, Ls. 8-19.)

1

asked you

if you’re for

Jones contends the

nigger power

district court erred in

To the extent the district court employed an incorrect analysis, it should nevertheless be
afﬁrmed 0n the correct legal theory. Icanovic V. State, 159 Idaho 524, 528, 363 P.3d 365,
369 (2015). Moreover, because the evidence is admissible, any error in how or why the
evidence was admitted is harmless. State V. Per_ry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974
(2010) (lower court Will not be reversed if error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
9

overruling his hearsay objection. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Jones has failed t0
the evidence

B.

is

hearsay,

much

less

show

error

by the

show how

district court.

Standard

Of Review

The

court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility 0f evidence.

trial

App. 2005). Review of a

trial

court’s hearsay rulings “is limited t0 determining Whether” the district court’s decision

was

State V. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 724, 117 P.3d 135, 138 (Ct.

“within the outer boundaries of its discretion,

99 ‘6

consistent Wit

and “reached through an exercise of reason.” In

re Estate

”

applicable legal standards,

0f Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941,

277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012).

C.

The Evidence Was Not Hearsay
“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that (1) the declarant does not

at the current trial or

make While

testifying

hearing and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted in the statement.” I.R.E. 801(0) (punctuation altered). Here the state did
not present evidence of the friend Schwartz’s statement for the truth of those statements,

but rather t0 prove that the friend in fact

made

the statements, as evidence of his (and

Jones’) racial motive for the crime. Jones, 0n appeal, acknowledges that the evidence

admitted t0 prove “Schwartz had actually

made

was

those racially—charged statements.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) That was, of course, the non-hearsay reason for admitting the

statements.

Having demonstrated

that the evidence

10

was not hearsay, Jones has

failed t0

show

the district court erred

Jones Has Failed T0

by overruling

his hearsay objection?

Show Cumulative EngiBecause He Has

T0 Show

Failed

Error

To

Cumulate

Under
themselves,

the doctrine 0f cumulative error, a series of

may

in the aggregate

show

the absence of a fair

A

Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).
cumulative error doctrine

is

no

trial.

errors,

harmless in

State V. Martinez, 125

necessary predicate t0 application 0f the

a ﬁnding 0f more than one error. State V. Hawkins, 131 Idaho

396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

are, therefore,

trial

As

set forth

above, Jones has failed to

show error. There

errors t0 cumulate.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm Jones’ conviction for malicious

harassment.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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Even

if there

had been

error,

it

was

certainly harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222,

245 P.3d

974 (lower court will not be reversed if error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Cobbs in fact testiﬁed to this exchange twice, once Without objection. (TL, p. 180, L. 19
— p. 181, L. 10.)
at
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